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ABSTRACT
We present evidence that many households have only a vague notion of what they are spending on
various consumption items. We then develop a life-cycle model that captures this "absent-
mindedness". The model generates precautionary spending, whereby absent-minded agents tend to
consume more than attentive ones. The model also predicts fluctuations over time in the level of
attention, and thereby sheds new light on the sharp reduction in consumption both at retirement, and
in cyclical downturns. Finally, we find patterns of attention in the data that are consistent with those
predicted by the model.
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Many of us are profoundly ignorant about how much we spend, and on what
we spend it. We develop a life cycle model of an “absent-minded” consumer
that captures this fact, as well as the uncertainty reducing role of activities
such as budgeting. The model generates a form of “precautionary spending”
in which absent-minded agents tend to consume more than attentive ones.
The model generates realistic variations in the level of attention over time,
thereby shedding new light on the sharp reductions in consumption both at
retirement, and in cyclical downturns. Finally, the model suggests intriguing
analogies between control problems of the sort encountered by our absent-
minded consumer and the more familiar problems of self control analyzed by
Strotz [1956], Laibson [1997], and Gul and Pesendorfer [2001].
The ﬁrst order of business is to empirically conﬁrm rampant consumer
ignorance. Evidence on this subject, and on the uncertainty reducing role
of budgetary attention, is presented in section 2. Given that existing data
are inadequate, our key ﬁndings derive from a survey that we designed for a
sample of TIAA-CREF clients. We asked respondents not only to estimate
their total outlays in the last year on various diﬀerent categories of spending,
but also to provide conﬁdence intervals around these estimates. As detailed
in section 2, the degree of uncertainty is remarkably high. The data reveal
also that those who monitor their spending more closely are less uncertain
about past spending.
In section 3 we develop a life cycle model of income and consumption con-
sistent with the facts of section 2. Following Piccione and Rubinstein [1997],
we treat consumers who do not monitor as absent-minded, uncertain as to
their precise location in the consumption-savings decision tree.1 In sections
4 and 5, we fully characterize a simple three-period version of the model and
track the incentive to monitor over the life cycle. We show that those in their
relatively wealthy middle years have the lowest incentive to monitor, and are
most likely to be absent-minded. In contrast, the incentive to monitor is
particularly high for those who are retired, since they have time on their
hands, declining wealth, and less ﬂexibility to adjust to unforeseen spending
by working harder in the future. The data conﬁrm that this pattern is indeed
1Absent-mindedness is a form of imperfect memory. There are obvious connections to
other models of imperfect memory, including Dow [1991], Mullianathan [1998], Bernheim
and Thomadsen [2002], and Wilson [2002]. Sims [2002] considers the implications of
information processing constraints, which may also be related.
1prevalent, with a sharp increase in monitoring behaviors at retirement.
Fluctuations over time in the level of monitoring are of most interest if
they correlate with changes in the level of spending. Our model suggests just
such a link, with inattention inducing a form of “precautionary spending”.2
Agents may be willing to consume more on average in order to ensure that
their absent-mindedness does not produce damaging under-consumption.3 In
combination with our ﬁnding of increased monitoring in retirement, this sug-
gests a novel explanation for the sharp decline in consumption at retirement
identiﬁed by Mariger [1987], Banks, Blundel and Tanner [1998], and Bern-
heim, Skinner and Weinberg [2001]. Retirement is associated with diminished
absent-mindedness, and reduced spending results.
In section 6 we present three applications of our model to topics other
than life-cycle consumption. First, we consider cyclical down-turns. If re-
ductions in income lead to increases in monitoring, then the accompanying
“belt-tightening” will exacerbate the fall in consumption. Second, we con-
sider analogies between the control problems of the type we model, and self
control problems. Both problems create incentives to keep assets in illiquid
form, and to restrict the use of credit cards. However the motivations for
these behaviors are entirely diﬀerent. In the case of self control problems,
holding assets in illiquid form and restricting credit card constitute valu-
able commitment devices. In the case of control problems, consumers value
illiquidity as an error-reduction device, while restrictions on credit card use
increase reliance on cash, which in turn increases the ﬂow of information con-
cerning their volume of spending. Finally, we relate our new ﬁndings to prior
work concerning the impact of ﬁnancial planning on wealth accumulation
(Lusardi [1999] and Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy [2003a]).
In technical terms, the key ingredient in our model is imperfect con-
trol and uncertain consumption ﬂows, rather than imperfect memory per
se. In the ﬁn a lp a r to fs e c t i o n6w en o t et h a ts u c hi m p e r f e c t i o n si nc o n t r o l
and uncertain consumption ﬂows may arise for reasons other than forgetful-
ness. These eﬀects may arise in search markets, in which consumers are only
2In precautionary savings models, the convexity of marginal utility implies that future
uncertainty raises the expected marginal utility of future consumption and hence the desire
to save. In our formulation of absent-mindedness a similar phenomenon occurs, only it is
current rather than future utility that is uncertain.
3In our model, a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion greater than unity is suﬃcient for
the consumption of the absent-minded consumer to exceed on average the consumption of
an attentive consumer.
2imperfectly aware of product characteristics (e.g. when purchasing a car).
Multi-person households may be especially prone to problems of this sort,
to the extent that communication and the alignment of interests are imper-
fect. Developing a general model to capture the many such imperfections of
control is an important open task.
2 Uncertain Consumption: Evidence
2.1 Measuring Uncertainty
It is folk wisdom among ﬁnancial planners that most of us do not keep track
of our purchases. Yet there is little prior research that conﬁrms or quanti-
ﬁes the resulting ignorance. What little evidence exists concerns biases in
memory due to forgetfulness. Politz [1958] surreptitiously recorded the su-
permarket expenditures of a sample of shoppers and interviewed them that
evening to see if they could recall their expenditures. He found that on
average consumers recalled 91% of the items purchased and 94% of their
total expenditures. In a study of home improvement expenditures, Neter
and Waksberg [1964], found that between a quarter and a half of all jobs
are forgotten within three months. More recently a number of studies have
compared diary and recall surveys of consumption data.4 The general con-
clusions of this literature are that diaries are signiﬁcantly more accurate and
that recall has a bias that varies with type of product. Regular purchases,
such as “how much do you spend on food at home?”, are more easily recalled.
Occasional purchases, such as “how much did you spend on clothing in the
last 3 months?”, are not.
While the above ﬁndings show that individuals are forgetful, they are
silent concerning subjective uncertainty. People may be wrong, yet con-
vinced that they are correct. Hence the ﬁrst requirement of our research is
to ﬁll in the gap in our knowledge concerning perceived uncertainty. Fortu-
nately we were able to include questions on this subject in a recent survey
of TIAA-CREF participants.5 The survey was mailed out in March 2003
4See Battistin, Miniaci, and Weber [2000], Battistin [2003], and Browning, Crossley
and Weber [2003].
5See Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy [2003a,b] for details concerning survey participants.
The main diﬀerences between this sample and the population at large is that this sample
tends to be wealthier and more highly educated.
3to approximately 2500 participant households. We received 1632 responses.
We asked participants to provide several estimates of how much they spent
during calendar year 2002 on several categories of consumption goods, as
follows:
• How much did your household spend in the calendar year 2002 on each
of the following categories? Please provide three estimates:
— A LOW estimate, where you are 90% sure that the correct answer
is above this number
— your CLOSEST estimate of the most accurate answer
— a HIGH estimate, where you are 90% sure that the correct answer
is below this number
The speciﬁc categories chosen were: food and drink at home; clothing;
telephone; and overall total amount of money spent using credit cards. Food
was chosen as the prototypical frequent purchase, clothing as the prototyp-
ical infrequent purchase. Telephone spending was included because it is in
principle easily measured by monthly bills. Total credit card spending was
included to see how an increase in scale impacted the degree of uncertainty.
Table 1 produces basic information on subjective uncertainty concerning
past spending for each of the our four categories. Our measure of individual
uncertainty is the 90-10 conﬁdence interval as a percent of total spending.
The ﬁrst column of table 1 displays the average value of this uncertainty
m e a s u r ef o rt h e9 4 3h o u s e h o l d sw h op r o vided reasonable information on all
categories.6 The second column records the standard deviation of this mea-
sure, while the third displays the share of spending on the category relative
to labor income for the 470 households in which one member was working
full time.
The answers reveal great uncertainty in all categories. For food and
drink at home, the average conﬁdence interval was 45% of total spending on
that category. For clothing, it was about 75%. The greater uncertainty for
clothing is consistent with the results of the recall-diary literature: clothing is
a more infrequent purchase. It is notable also that uncertainty is equally high
6We deleted three observations. In two cases subjective uncertainty concerning food
and drink at home was greater than 9 and in one case telephone uncertainty was equal to
13. These responses were 25 to 35 standard deviations above the next highest responses.
4for telephone and credit card spending, despite the availability of monthly
telephone bills, and despite the fact that credit card spending comprises
about 30% of labor income. The magnitude of uncertainty is all the more
striking in light of the standard ﬁnding in the psychology literature that
people tend to report conﬁdence intervals that are far too narrow.7 We
interpret these results as strong motivation for a model in which agents are
not fully aware of their level of spending.
We can compare our reported expenditures as a share of income to data
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Between 1998 and 2001, spending
on food at home has comprised roughly 8% of total expenditures, whereas
spending on “apparel and services” comprised roughly 5% (BLS [2003]). Our
numbers are comparable.8
The standard deviation numbers in Table 1 indicate that the level of
uncertainty varies greatly over the sample. In the next subsection we look
to see if any of this variation is endogenous.
2.2 Impacting Uncertainty
It seems intuitively clear that consumers can adopt measures, such as mon-
itoring their spending, that will reduce their uncertainty concerning how
much they spend and on what they spend it. Data from our survey conﬁrm
the endogeneity of the level of uncertainty. We asked households to report
on a 1 to 6 scale (6=agree strongly, 5 agree, 4 agree somewhat, 3=disagree
somewhat, 2=disagree, 1=disagree strongly) the extent to which they agreed
with two statements characterizing the intensity with whey they monitor
their spending:
• Please indicate the extent to which you agree that each of the following
statements describes your household (or just you, if you are a single
person household). In my household we:
— Regularly set advance budgets for our spending.
7In a typical experiment, individuals are asked to answer 10 questions in which they
are most unlikely to have a point estimate of the correct answer (e.g. the length in miles
of the Amazon river). They are then asked to provide a 90% conﬁdence interval for the
correct answer. For the typical respondent, the truth will lie inside the stated conﬁdence
interval only in 3-4 of the 10 cases.
8Diﬀerences may be due to diﬀerences in sample, systematic errors in memory, or in
diﬀerences between labor income and total expenditure.
5— Regularly keep track of our actual spending.
Our hypothesis was that an increase in either of these two measures would
diminish subjective uncertainty. Table 2 presents results from eight regres-
sions, in which we ran uncertainty measures for each of our four categories
separately on the answers to the budgeting question and the tracking ques-
tion, as well as the age of the respondent. The sample comprises the 929
households who provided complete data on all of the uncertainty and atten-
tion measures. Standard errors are in parentheses.
In line with our hypothesis, all of the coeﬃcients in table 2 are neg-
ative, and many are signiﬁcant at the 5% level, suggesting that attention
reduces uncertainty. The eﬀects of advance budgeting on food and clothing
uncertainty are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. These eﬀects are also large. To
appreciate the scale of the uncertainty reduction, note ﬁr s tt h a te a c ho ft h e
coeﬃcients in table 2 should be read in conjunction with the coeﬃcients in
table 1. For example, table 1 shows that the average measure of uncertainty
is 0.45. The -0.22 coeﬃcient in the ﬁrst row and column of table 2 therefore
implies that a unit increase in budgeting reduces the level of uncertainty by
more than 4.5% of its initial level. Given also that a one standard deviation
increase in budgeting corresponds to an increase in the budgeting measure
of 1.4, we conclude that such an increase is associated on average with a
7% decline in uncertainty concerning food consumption. The proportionate
reduction in uncertainty concerning clothing consumption induced by a one
standard deviation increase in budgeting is likewise 7%.
While the endogeneity of subjective uncertainty is clear from Table 2,
there are several reasons to believe that these coeﬃcients understate the
magnitude of the eﬀects. One reason for this is that measurement error is
likely to bias our estimates towards zero. Fortunately, we have available
a simple method to reduce the extent of the measurement error, since we
asked a variant of the budgeting question on a previous survey. We therefore
have two responses to the budgeting question for 830 of the participants in
our sample, which allows us to control for measurement error by using the
prior response to instrument for the current response. When we do this the
estimated coeﬃcients on food and clothing uncertainty rise to .031 and .047
respectively. A second reason that the impact of monitoring on uncertainty
may be larger than reported is that while we ran linear regressions, the
data appear to favor the use of concave transformations of the uncertainty
measure. For example, when we regress the square root the our measure of
6uncertainty on the level of age and advance budgeting, all of the coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and the eﬀects of tracking one’s expenditure
on food, clothes and credit card uncertainty are all signiﬁcant at the 1%
level.9 The ﬁnal reason why the impact of monitoring on uncertainty may be
larger than indicated in table 2 is reverse causation. Since greater uncertainty
creates an incentive for increased attention, these feedback eﬀects will tend
to reduce measured coeﬃcients in Table 2.
3 The General Model
In this section we ﬁr s tl a yo u tt h eg e n e r a lm o d e l ,a n dt h e np r o v et h a ti ti s
coherent, in the sense that optimal policies always exist.
3.1 Model Structure
The critical modeling issue is how to capture consumers’ uncertainty con-
cerning their spending behavior. Our strategy is to follow Piccione and
Rubinstein [1997] and link these problems to agents’ confusion concerning
their location in a decision tree. Piccione and Rubinstein analyze the op-
timal strategy of an “absent-minded” driver who must turn right after a
certain number of blocks, and who knows that she will at some point lose
track of her precise location. They make the strong simplifying assumption
that the driver is completely without memory, seeing all corners as identical.
We adopt both their concept of absent-mindedness, and also the simpliﬁca-
tion of complete forgetfulness. In each discrete period of life, t ∈ {1,...,T},
our consumers receive a sequence of consumption opportunities. If they pay
monitoring costs of m (for simplicity, these costs are measured directly in
terms of utility), they will have complete recall of the number of such oppor-
tunities previously taken in this period. If they fail to invest in monitoring,
they will completely lose track of any previously taken opportunities.
In modeling imperfect memory, one needs to remove indirect tracking
devices (e.g. a driver with a GPS always knows her position). In the case
9We also estimated an ordered probit relating centiles of the uncertainty measure to
dummy variables for the diﬀerent levels of budgeting and tracking. In almost all cases
the coeﬃcients on the attention dummies were diminishing in the level of attention. The
zero restrictions on the attention dummies were rejected at greater than .1% signiﬁcance
in most cases.
7of consumption spending, the trick is to separate the ﬂow of purchases in
any given period from the ﬂow of utility-giving consumption. Absent this
separation, agents may refer to an internal “hedonomitor” to instantly gauge
marginal utility and infer from it their prior level of spending. The modeling
device that accomplishes this is to introduce two distinct states, H and S.
Here H refers to home, and S = {1,2,...,∞} refers to a street with a count-
ably inﬁnite set of shops, indexed by i,t h a tc o n t a i ng o o d sf o rt h ec o n s u m e r
to purchase. Consumers begin each period at home. In order to make pur-
chases for the period, they must move to the shopping street and enter stores
in increasing order from i =1 . In each store entered, the consumer orders x
units of the single consumption good for later delivery at home. In order to
carry out the act of consumption, the consumer has to make the irreversible
decision to return home and await delivery of that period’s purchases. The
utility from any given stream of ﬁnal consumption is deﬁned by a standard
additively separable utility function, with period utility u(c) and discount
factor β. We assume that u(c) is real valued except possibly at c =0 .I n
addition u(c) is increasing and weakly concave, with limc→∞u0(c)=0 .
We now discuss the precise structure of the overall shopping strategy.
At the start of each period, the ﬁrst decision that consumers must make
is whether or not to pay that period’s monitoring costs of m>0.T h o s e
who pay this cost are standard consumers, continuously aware of their prior
spending in the period. For this reason, their shopping strategies condition
on the precise store in which they are located. Formally, a strategy for a
consumer who monitors is a function ηt : S → [0,1] specifying for each i ∈ S
the probability of returning home rather than continuing to the next store
conditional on being in this store. In contrast, those who choose not to
monitor are assumed to be completely unable to distinguish among stores.
This implies that all of the locations in S are elements of the same information
set. These consumers must follow the same (possibly random) strategy at
each location, ψt : {S} → [0,1].
As Piccione and Rubinstein stress, there is one delicate issue concerning
the nature of the strategic options available to absent-minded agents. This
issue is whether or not they can commit to a shopping strategy while at
home, or rather have the ﬂexibility to adjust the strategy on the street.
In our model we assume that commitment is possible, searching for what
Piccione and Rubinstein call the ex ante optimal strategy. This solution
concept is supported by the experimental results of Huck and Müller [2001],
and is equivalent to what Piccione and Rubinstein call the modiﬁed multi-self
8equilibrium, which involves identifying each visit to an information set with
ad i ﬀerent self and analyzing the resulting intrapersonal game.10 In addition,
using this notion of equilibrium greatly simpliﬁes the analysis, since it allows
us to use dynamic programming to solve the model.
Once the period’s monitoring decision is made and the shopping strategy
set, consumers go onto the shopping street and buy commodities according
to the prespeciﬁed strategy. At the end of the shopping day, the consumer
returns home and awaits deliveries. We assume that a consumer who visited
precisely N stores before returning home is committed to consuming the
entire amount in the given period, ct = Nx. Given that there is no bound
to the number of stores that may be visited, the issue arises as to whether
or not the consumer can aﬀord all that has been purchased. To resolve this
issue, we assume that each individual has an unbounded endowment of labor
that can be used to generate income at the end of each period.11 Moreover,
we assume that consumers cannot borrow against future human capital. If
consumption in any period exceeds ﬁnancial resources, the consumer must
work at the end of the period to pay oﬀ the excess consumption. Of course,
consumers may also choose to put in additional work to accumulate resources
for future consumption. We assume that the disutility of labor in each period
is described by a function v(l) with v(0) = 0,v 0(l) > 0 and v00(l) ≥ 0.T o
ensure positive consumption we assume that v0(0) <u 0(0).
To close the model we derive the budget constraints. The price of the
consumption good is assumed to be constant over time, and is normalized to
1. We let wt > 0 be the real wage per unit of labor for an individual in the
tth period of life. We allow the productivity of labor to be period speciﬁct o
allow for a reasonable life-cycle pattern of earning power, and in particular
for the possible fall in productivity in later life. We assume that the agent
begins with initial wealth W1 ≥ 0. The real interest rate between periods is
assumed to be constant at r. Letting Wt denote wealth at the beginning of
period t, wealth evolves according to the following equation:
Wt+1 =( 1+r)(Wt + wtlt − ct).( 1 )
10The alternative solution concept discussed by Piccione and Rubinstein involves looking
for a ﬁxed point: a strategy from which the shopper would not choose to deviate while on
the street.
11More intricate alternatives are to assume that purchases can be returned with some
penalty cost, or that some agency such as a credit card company can cut the consumer oﬀ
once consumption has exceeded resources. One might also allow the consumer to declare
bankruptcy if consumption turns out to be too high.
9Our assumptions on borrowing and on the supply of labor imply that Wt ≥ 0
in all periods.
Before specifying value functions and proving that optimal strategies ex-
ist, we make one last simplifying assumption. We consider the limit of the
model as x, the quantity available in each store, approaches zero. This
smooths out the discreteness in the model and transform sums over S into
integrals.12 This means that the strategies available to the absent-minded
consumer comprise all exponential distributions of ﬁnal consumption, de-
ﬁned by the speciﬁc hazard rate chosen. A ﬁxed probability of stopping at
every point in S translates in the limit as x approaches zero into an expo-
nential density of stopping times, pe−pc,w h e r ep is the ﬁx e dr a t ea tw h i c h
the consumer chooses to quit shopping and return home.
3.2 Existence of an Optimum
In order to prove that our maximization problem has a well-deﬁned solution,
we ﬁrst write the model recursively. Let Vt(Wt) denote the value of an optimal
policy for an agent with wealth Wt ≥ 0 at the start of period t.S i n c et h eﬁrst
choice that the agent makes is whether or not to monitor, we can express Vt









where the superscripts M and A refer respectively to monitoring and to being
absent-minded.
Given that the marginal utility of consumption is positive, the only ques-
tion in the ﬁnal period for a consumer who monitors concerns the optimal
amount of work to put in:
V
M
T (WT)=m a x
l≥0
u(W + wTl) − v(l) − m.
The only decision that must be made in the ﬁnal period by an absent-minded
consumer concerns the stopping rate that maximizes expected utility, where
the expectation is taken with respect to the exponential distribution:
V
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12Setting up the model with discrete S simpliﬁes the deﬁnition of a strategy as a mapping
into probabilities in [0,1].
10The ﬁrst term is the expected utility from consumption. The second term
is the expected cost. The cost involves only the labor needed to ﬁnance
consumption in excess of WT. Any unused wealth in the ﬁnal period is lost.




t (Wt)=m a x
c,l
[u(c) − v(l)+βVt+1(Wt+1)] − m,
with Wt+1 as deﬁned in the budget constraint (1). Note that since there is no
uncertainty when the agent monitors, the timing of the consumption and the













u(c) − v(l) − βVt+1(Wt+1)
¸
dc.
Again Wt+1 is as deﬁned in the budget constraint.(1). Note that the con-
straint on period t labor eﬀort ensures that Wt+1 ≥ 0.
With the value functions in place, we are in a position to establish Propo-
sition 1, which concerns existence of an optimal policy. The proof is in Ap-
pendix 1.
Proposition 1 There exists an optimal policy.
4A S p e c i a l C a s e
In order to understand ﬂuctuations in the monitoring incentive over the
course of the life cycle, we set up and solve a simple stylized three period
model. The assumptions are presented in section 4.1, and the solution char-
acterized in section 4.2. The economic implications are discussed in the next
section.
4.1 The Model
Our life cycle assumptions allow for possible liquidity constraints in early life,
and a realistic pattern of labor productivity over the life cycle. In addition,
we make simplifying assumptions concerning the rate of return on savings in
relation to the discount rate.
11Assumption A1: W1 =0 .
Assumption A2: Productivity is highest in the middle period of life: w2 >
w1,w 3.
Assumption A3: The rate of return on savings is insuﬃcient to compensate
for discounting and the productivity increase between periods 1 and 2,
yet strong enough to so compensate in the ﬁnal period:
w3
w2




The ﬁrst two assumptions are self-explanatory. With respect to the ﬁnal
assumption, given that the wage is seen as falling signiﬁcantly in the last
period of life, the left hand inequality is naturally met. The right hand in-
equality is more substantive. It sets a lower bound for the rate of growth
in real wages between the early years and the middle years of life to ensure
that the early years of life are not spent saving up for the typically more
prosperous middle years. This condition is likely to be met in any reasonable
parametrization, at least provided the real interest rate is not too high.
We make two ﬁnal assumptions on u(c) and v(l) to simplify algebraic
derivations. We assume that utility is of the constant relative risk aversion
variety, with an additional restriction to ensure the existence of all relevant in-
tegrals.13 We assume also that the disutility of labor is constant. This allows
us to focus our analysis on how absent-mindedness impacts the marginal util-
ity of current consumption, rather than having to deal simultaneously with
the impact on future consumption. Generalizations of these assumptions are
discussed in section 5.





Assumption A5: The marginal disutility of labor is constant:
v(l)=l.
13It is a trivial matter to relax this assumption. However, in order to do this we have
to add uninteresting new parameters to the model that serve only to obscure the main
points.
12With these assumptions in place, we are ready to characterize the optimal
pattern of monitoring, consumption, and wealth accumulation over the life
cycle.
4.2 The Solution
Proposition 2 presents the complete formal solution to the model. Note that
our solution for the optimal shopping rate when absent-minded is stated in
terms of the corresponding level of expected consumption. Note also that
we present a strict inequality to characterize the region in which there is
monitoring. When the opposite inequality holds, the unique solution is to be
absent-minded, while if there is equality the consumer is indiﬀerent between
the two strategies.
Proposition 2: With Assumptions A1-A5, the solution to the model is as
follows:
1. The decision to monitor. The consumer will monitor in periods 1






























2. Consumption when monitoring. The optimal level of consumption






where α1 = w1, α2 = w2,a n dα3 = w2β(1 + r).
3. Consumption when absent-minded. In periods 1 and 2, the absent-


















4. Labor supply. In period 1, labor supply is equal to realized con-
sumption divided by the wage rate: l1 = c1/w1. I np e r i o d2 ,
l2 =( c2 + s2)/w2 where s2 denotes saving in period 2 for period
3 consumption. In period 3, l3 =m a x {0,[c3 − (1 + r)s2]/w3}.
5. Saving. Saving is only positive in period 2, and depends on the
monitoring decision in period 3. Should the consumer monitor
in period 3, sM
2 = cM
3 /(1 + r). Should the consumer be absent-
minded, sA
2 = cA
3 /(1 + r).
The proof of the proposition is straightforward. With assumptions A1-
A3, it is optimal for the individual to work in period 1 just enough to pay
for consumption in that period. Given zero initial wealth and the liquidity
constraints, the consumer must pay for period 1 consumption with period
1 labor. Given the wage proﬁle, it is strictly optimal to pay for period 2
consumption with period 2 labor. This explains the absence of saving in
period 1. The period 1 decisions therefore have no impact on later decisions.
Assumptions A2 and A3 and the linear marginal disutility of labor imply
that it is optimal to ﬁnance some of period 3 consumption with period 2
labor, and that the amount saved in period 2 is independent of period 2 con-
sumption. This allows us to separate period 2 monitoring and consumption
decisions from the period 3 decisions. In this way, we break the three period
model into a series of three static optimization problems.
To translate these comments into a full characterization of the optimal
policy, we begin by analyzing the consumption of a consumer who monitors.
Given the functional form assumptions A4-A5, the consumer who monitors







Given zero initial wealth in both periods, the cost of a unit of consumption




14A consumer who monitors in the third period can anticipate this choice
in period 2. Given A2-A5, it is optimal to accumulate resources in period
2s u ﬃcient to ﬁnance all of period 3 consumption. It takes c/[w2(1 + r)]











The optimal policy of the absent-minded consumer is a bit more compli-
cated, but with the functional form assumptions A3-A4, this problem takes















We can simplify this integral in two ways. First, note that associated with a
policy p is an expected level of consumption ¯ c:








Second, we apply a change of variable: z = pc. With these two amendments,
the maximization problem becomes
max
¯ c
A¯ c1−σ − 1
1 − σ
− αt¯ c.
The only change from the standard model is the presence of A =
R ∞
0 z1−σe−zdc.14
The optimal choices cA
1 and cA
2 follow immediately.
If the individual does not monitor in period 3, the consumer chooses























14Note that this integral is well-deﬁned only for σ ∈ (0,2), which explains the need for
assumption A2.
15It takes s2/w2 units of period 2 labor to accumulate s2 units of saving. s2
units of saving ﬁnances up to (1+ r)s2 units of period 3 consumption. Con-
sumption in excess of this amount must be ﬁnanced by labor in period 3,
which earns a wage w3. After a little algebra the problem reduces to:
max
s2,¯ c −l + β




The optimal choices cA
3 and sA
2 follow immediately.
Given the optimal consumption choices, we can easily compute the utility
when absent-minded and compare it to the utility under monitoring. The
conditions determining the choice to monitor follow immediately, rounding
out the solution to the model.
5 Economic Implications
We begin in section 5.1 by comparing the level of consumption in a period
of absent-mindedness with that in a period of monitoring. With standard
assumptions on preferences, absent-mindedness gives rise to increased con-
sumption. In section 5.2 we consider the pattern of monitoring over the life
cycle, and show that the incentive to monitor is highest in the early and
late years of life, and lowest in the relatively unconstrained middle years. In
section 5.3 we provide some conﬁrmatory evidence from our survey on the
life cycle pattern of monitoring, and relate these ﬁndings to existing results
concerning the fall in consumption at retirement.
5.1 Precautionary Spending
Proposition 3 shows that absent-minded consumers spend more on average
than do attentive consumers if and only if their utility is more risk averse
than log utility.
Proposition 3: In periods 1 and 2, there is the following relationship be-
tween cM and cA:
1. If σ ∈ [0,1) then cM <c A.
2. If σ =1 ,t h e ncM = cA.
163. If σ>1,t h e ncM >c A.
Proof: From Proposition 2, we see that cA is greater than (less than,
equal to) cM as A is greater than (less than, equal to) 1.T h ev a l u eo fA,i n
turn, depends on the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Given the concavity











It follows that Ais greater than (less than, equal to) 1 if σ is greater than
(less than, equal to) 1.¤
There is a simple intuition behind Proposition 3. Using the change of
variable z = c/¯ c, the ﬁrst order condition for the absent-minded consumer in







Hence the convexity of cu0(c) is a suﬃcient condition for absent-mindedness
to increase consumption. Given CRRA preferences, cu0(c) is convex if σ>1,
linear if σ =1 , and concave if σ<1. Since almost all empirical work ﬁnds
σ>1, the relevant case is cu0(c) is convex. Absent-mindedness raises the
level of consumption: cA >c M. Whether or not absent-mindedness leads to
higher consumption in period 3 is a bit more complicated. As in periods 1
and 2, σ>1 tends to increase the marginal utility of consumption in period
3. However since β(1+r)w2 >w 3, absent-mindedness also tends to increase
the costs of consumption as well. Which eﬀect dominates depends on the
parameters of the model.
There is a close relationship between absent-mindedness and precaution-
ary saving. Exactly the same condition, the convexity of cu0(c), arises in the
precautionary saving literature when risks are multiplicative (Sandmo, 1970).
The main diﬀerence between the two literatures is where the uncertainty lies:
today and tomorrow. That diﬀerence leads to opposite predictions regarding
consumption and saving. If cu0(c) is convex, then uncertainty regarding fu-
ture consumption raises the expected marginal utility of future consumption
and leads to precautionary saving. With absent-mindedness, uncertainty
regarding current consumption raises the expected marginal utility of cur-
rent consumption and leads to precautionary spending. Consumption moves
towards the period in which consumption is uncertain.
17In a more general model, there would be a more complex connection be-
tween absent-mindedness and consumption. Our assumption of a constant
marginal disutility of labor removes any eﬀect of consumption realizations
today on the resources available for consumption tomorrow. If instead the
disutility of labor were strictly convex, absent-mindedness would not only
make consumption today more uncertain, it would also make future con-
sumption more uncertain. The resulting incentive to increase precaution-
ary saving would counteract to a certain extent the desire for precautionary
spending. This eﬀect of current consumption on future resources will gen-
erally be greater nearer to the end of life. As the time horizon increases,
consumption mistakes today may be spread over a greater and greater num-
ber of periods. The resulting eﬀect on permanent income will therefore be
lower.
5.2 Monitoring and the Life Cycle
Proposition 4 describes the incentive to monitor. We focus on the standard
case in which σ>1 and comment on other possibilities.
Proposition 4 Given σ>1 and Assumptions 1-3:
1. If monitoring were costless, then the consumer would always choose
to monitor.
2. The incentive to monitor is decreasing in wt.
3. The incentive to monitor is greater in period 1 than in period 2.
All three statements follow directly from part 1 of Proposition 2. The
intuition for the ﬁrst result is that an attentive consumer could choose to
randomize consumption in a way similar to the absent-minded consumer, but
because of the strict concavity of utility, would choose not to do so. Absent-
mindedness results in mistakes which reduce the utility from consumption
(note that this result holds regardless of the value of σ).
The intuition for the second statement is that the loss due to absent-
mindedness results from the randomness of consumption and the concavity
of utility. An increase in wt reduces the eﬀective cost of consumption in
period t and raises consumption. With σ>1, utility becomes less concave
18as consumption rises, thereby reducing the loss due to absent-mindedness.15
The third statement follows directly from the second and the assumptions
on wt.
The monotonicity of the incentive to monitor implies that for each level
of m, there is a unique wage wt(m) such that if w<w t(m) the agent is
absent-minded and for w>w t(m) t h ea g e n tm o n i t o r s .N o t et h a ti np e r i o d
3, this cutoﬀ also depends on the wage level in period 2.
Whether the incentive to monitor in the second period is greater or less
than the incentive to monitor in the third period is more complicated. There
are two eﬀects. On the one hand, if β(1+r) > 1, then some consumption in
period 3 that is ﬁn a n c e db yl a b o ri np e r i o d2i sc h e a p e ri nt e r m so fl a b o re ﬀort
than consumption in period 2. This eﬀect would favor absent-mindedness.
On the other hand, the possibilities that accumulated saving may go unspent
and that consumption in excess of saving must be ﬁnanced by costly period
3 labor, both raise the eﬀective cost of the absent-minded policy. Which
eﬀect dominates is generally ambiguous. However if β(1 + r) is close to 1 it
is easy to show that the second eﬀect dominates: the incentive to monitor in
period 3 is less than the incentive to monitor in period 2. Since conventional
parameterizations place β(1+r) close to 1, we will take this as the benchmark
case.
The results in Proposition 4, describe a life cycle of attention. Attention is
high early in life when the cost of consumption is high and the opportunities
for borrowing are low. Attention wanes in middle age as resources improve.
It rises again in retirement when it is costly to leave resources unspent and
additional labor eﬀort yields a low reward.16
Together the results in Propositions 3 and 4 have implications for con-
sumption over the life-cycle. Greater attention tends to pushes down con-
sumption early and late in life. absent-mindedness tends to raise consump-
tion in mid-life. Overall, these eﬀects exacerbate the standard hump-shaped
life-cycle pattern of consumption.
15In periods 1 and 2, the loss due to absent-mindedness falls to zero as wages rise to
inﬁnity. If σ<1,t h e nt h ee ﬀe c to fw a g e si sr e v e r s e d . I fσ =1 , then the loss due to
absent-mindeness is independent of the level of wages.
16This life-cycle pattern of attention reﬂects the evolution of the beneﬁts of attention
over the life-cycle. We have assumed that the costs of monitoring are constant. As
monitoring eﬀort is relatively costly for the middle aged and the rich, a reasonable modeling
of costs should only reinforce this pattern.
195.3 Evidence
Our data allow us to test whether or not the model’s predictions concern-
ing the life-cycle pattern of attention hold in our TIAA-CREF sample. We
have data on whether the respondent is working full time, working part-time,
unemployed, or retired. We also have data on their age and net worth. We
regress the answers to our questions concerning advance budgeting and track-
ing of spending on these variables. The sample includes 1196 respondents for
whom we have data on all of the variables included in the regressions. Table
3 presents results.
The principle ﬁnding is the large and signiﬁcant eﬀect of retirement on
monitoring behaviors. For example, retirement is associated with an eco-
nomically and statistically signiﬁcant .6 increase in the budgeting measure.17
Other empirical results are also generally consistent with the predictions of
the model. In the data, budgeting is inversely related with wealth as mea-
sured by ﬁnancial assets. Since asset-holdings generally rise early in life and
fall late in life, this correlation is consistent with the model’s U-shaped life-
cycle pattern of attention. It is also consistent with the model’s positive
correlation between attention and the marginal utility of wealth. Finally,
attention is inversely related to age, which is consistent with the model’s
prediction that the young are less absent-minded.
Combining the result of this section concerning the increase in monitoring
at retirement with the earlier ﬁnding that monitors tend to spend less, our
model predicts a discrete decline in consumption at retirement. This is con-
sistent with the evidence. The fact that many households undergo a sharp
decline in consumption at retirement was noted by Mariger [1987], Banks,
Blundel and Tanner [1998], and Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg [2001].
Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy [2003b] show that this decline is largely antici-
pated prior to retirement, a fact that rules out many alternative explanations
that rely on systematic expectational errors.
17We get similar results for our measures of ﬁnancial planning behavior. Retirees are
more likely to monitor the allocation and performance of their investments and to update
their plans for their long-term ﬁnancial future.
206 Applications and Extensions
6.1 Belt-Tightening in Recessions
Our model of absent-mindedness may have implications for business cycles.
The same forces that lead to ﬂuctuations in absent-mindedness over the life-
cycle may lead to cyclical ﬂuctuations in attention that exacerbate cyclical
movements in consumption. In a cyclical downturn, those with fewer re-
sources and more time, such as the unemployed, may decide to pay greater
attention to their spending. This may further dampen their consumption
and amplify the eﬀects of the downturn in economic activity.
Short-run ﬂuctuations in monitoring may have implications not only for
cyclical ﬂuctuations, but also for the debate on the excess sensitivity of con-
sumption to income. If an increase in income is also associated with an
increase in absent-mindedness, then we would expect that the increase in
consumption would be somewhat greater than what would be justiﬁed under
the standard permanent income hypothesis.
6.2 The Analogy with Self Control
The most obvious analogy between our model and models of self control
problems is the ﬁnding concerning precautionary spending. This is spending
over and above the amount that the consumer would ideally choose. Absent-
minded consumers who indulge in this form of spending may look like they
have self control problems, since they will wish that they has spent less. The
source of the over-consumption, however, is a problem of control rather than
self control.
Another interesting analogy concerns the desire for constraints. It is well-
understood that constraints on spending may be of value to those with self
control problems. Our absent-minded consumer does not have a self control
problem, but her inability to precisely control spending may nevertheless
render such constraints valuable. Suppose that the absent-minded consumer
had access to a technology in period 2 (other periods are similar) that would
at cost κ cut oﬀ consumption as soon as it reached some level ˆ c.T h em a x i -







−pc[u(c) − α2c]dc + e
−pˆ c [u(ˆ c) − λˆ c − κ]
21It is clear that the consumer would like to us this technology. The ﬁrst
order condition for ˆ c sets,
u
0(ˆ c)=α2 − pκ.
The agent sets the constraint where the loss in utility from consumption
equals the cost of invoking the constraint. Of course, the reason that con-
sumers like constraints in this model is not that they limit behavior, but
rather that they provide information concerning an already excessive level of
spending.
The desire of an absent-minded consumer for information provides a third
and ﬁnal analogy with self control problems. Standard explanations for the
impact of credit cards on spending stress their dangers to those with self
control problems. They may be similarly problematic for absent-minded
agents. The use of cash is potentially very informative about spending. The
amount of cash in one’s wallet or purse is a signal as to how much has
been spent, and trips to the bank provide an opportunity to check one’s
account balance. Moreover, an agent will tend to run out of cash before
spending excessive amounts. In all of these ways the use of cash promotes
attentiveness. Credit cards, on the other hand, remove this crutch. They
promote absent-mindedness, and may thereby increase spending.18
6.3 Planning and Wealth Accumulation
Lusardi [2000] and Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy [2003a] show that people who
plan for their retirement tend to accumulate greater wealth. This raises the
question of why planning matters. A view that planners are more informed
about the future works in the wrong direction. If planners faced less future
uncertainty then they would have less incentive to save for precautionary rea-
sons. Our model suggests a more promising line of argument concerning the
relationship between ﬁnancial planning and wealth accumulation. If people
who engage in ﬁnancial planning activities are more likely to pay attention
to their consumption, then they have less of an incentive to engage in pre-
cautionary spending. This increases their saving rate and thereby increases
their wealth.19
18The role of cash as a substitute for memory is reminiscant of Kocherlakota [1998]
analysis of money in a search model.
19Ameriks, Caplin, Leahy, and Tyler [2003c] suggest an alternative explanation of the
link between planning and wealth accumulation. For some, planning may be a means for
226.4 Absent-Mindedness as a Behavioral Error
Our model provides a highly-structured framework in which to analyze a
consumer who is aware that she does not have perfect control of her con-
sumption, and makes behavioral errors. In the model, these mistakes arise
because of imperfect memory and imperfect monitoring. However similar
mistakes may arise for entirely diﬀerent reasons. For example, suppose that
agents diﬀer in their tastes and that the quality of the match between any
given individual and any chosen commodity uncertain. Suppose further that
one can expend eﬀort searching amongst goods, and that in so doing one can
reduce the uncertainty in the match. In this case, search eﬀort plays much
t h es a m er o l ea sa t t e n t i o nd o e si no u rm o d e l .T h eg r e a t e ri st h es e a r c he ﬀort,
the less uncertain the corresponding consumption ﬂow.
Another example of mistakes in consumption revolves around imperfect
communication within the household. It may take eﬀort for one person to
understand the preferences of others. Equally, it may take strong commu-
nication for the group as a whole to act eﬃciently. One may expect many
mistakes to be made, the extent of which will diminish with increases in
eﬀorts at understanding and communication.
We believe that the qualitative results of our paper will survive addition
of these and other sources of errors in consumption. The question of how
best to structure a general model capturing the many underlying sources of
error remains open. One simple way forward would be to suppose that when
agents spend x dollars they get u(x + ε) units of utility. By making the
variance of ε declining in the level of attention, one would expect to recover
results closely analogous to those we have derived in our model. Developing
a work-horse model of this variety is a high priority in future research.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have presented evidence that many consumers know little about their
pattern of spending. We developed a life cycle model consistent with this
evidence. The model provides new insights into ﬂuctuations in spending




The general structure of the proof of the existence of an optimal policy is
standard. There are several complications due to our modeling of absent-
mindedness. First, absent-mindedness leads to unbounded choice sets. Labor
l and the hazard rate p naturally lie in [0,∞]. As the standard theorems
require compact choice sets, we use the bijection ϕ(x):[ 0 ,1] → [0,∞] where
ϕ(x)=x/(1 − x) to relate [0,1] to [0,∞].A c h o i c e o f x in [0,1] implies a
choice ϕ(x) in [0,∞] and visa versa.
Second, in order to apply standard results like the Theorem of the Maxi-
mum, we want to insure that the functions that describe the payoﬀ to a choice
are real-valued functions. This requires that they not take the values of ±∞.
Natural utility functions, including the one used in the example of section 4,
are unbounded as choices approach 0 or ∞. We can easily introduce a lower
b o u n dt oa na r b i t r a r yp a y o ﬀ π(x) without aﬀecting the optimal choice of
x, by considering the transformed payoﬀ ˆ π(x)=m a x {π(x),π(¯ x) − c} where
¯ x is an arbitrary feasible choice of x and c is an arbitrary strictly positive
constant. Choices of x that maximize ˆ π(x) will maximize π(x) and visa versa.
Showing that payoﬀ functions are bounded above is more diﬃcult. In
standard problems, one considers payoﬀ functions that are the sum of beneﬁts
B(x) and costs C(x). The beneﬁt function is assumed to be real valued
for x ∈ (0,∞), continuous, increasing, and to have marginal beneﬁts that
diminishes to zero as x approaches inﬁnity. The cost function is assumed to be
real valued x ∈ [0,∞), continuous, increasing and to have marginal costs that
are in the limit strictly positive. Together these assumptions imply that the
beneﬁts eventually outweigh the costs, so that the payoﬀ function is bounded
above. The problem that arises in the current case is that the value function
is the maximum of the value of being absent-minded and monitoring, and
t h e r e f o r em a yn o tb ed i ﬀerentiable. Hence we cannot speak of the marginal
beneﬁt. Our solution is to show where necessary that the beneﬁto fa c t i o ni s
bounded above by a diﬀerentiable function whose derivative approaches zero
as the relevant choice approaches inﬁnity. With these preliminaries in mind,
we turn to the proof.
Proposition 1: There exists an optimal policy.
Proof: The proof is by induction. Consider ﬁrst period T and as-
sume that the agent chooses to pay attention in period T.L e t g1(x,W)=
24u(W + wTϕ(x)) − v(ϕ(x)).F o re a c hW, our assumptions on u and v imply
that g1(x;W) is bounded above. It may, however, approach −∞ as x ap-
proaches zero or one. Let g2(x,W)=m a x {g1(x,W),g(.5,W)−1}. g2(x,W)
maps [0,1] × [0,∞) into R.A n y c h o i c e o f x that maximizes g2(x,W),
maximizes g1(x,W). The assumptions on u and v imply that g2(x,W)
is continuous. We can therefore apply the Theorem of the Maximum to
g2(x,W).F o r e a c h W ∈ [0,∞),l e tV M
T (W)=m a x x∈[0,1] g2(x,W) and
G1(W)={x ∈ [0,1] : g2(x,W)=V M
T (W)}.T h e n V M
T (W) is a continu-
ous real-valued function, and G1(W) is a non-empty, compact valued and
upper hemi-continuous correspondence.
We will one more property of V M
T (W) in order to bound the payoﬀ func-
tion in the induction step. Given the assumptions on u and v, V (W) is
diﬀerentiable. By the envelope theorem, V M0
T (W)=u0(cM
T ).G i v e n t h e a s -
sumptions on u and v,a sW approaches inﬁnity, cM
T approaches inﬁnity.
Since limc→∞ u0(c)=0by assumption, it follows that limW→∞ V M0
T (W)=0 .
Similar arguments apply if the agent chooses to remain absent-minded in
period T.L e t g3(x,W)=ϕ(x)
R
e−ϕ(x)c[u(c) − v(max{0,(c − W)/wT})]dc,
and let g4(x,W)=m a x {g1(x),g(.5)−1}.G i v e nW, u(c)−v(max0,W−c/w)
is bounded above by assumption. Therefore g3(x,W) is bounded above for
given W. g4 therefore maps [0,1] × [0,∞) into R. g4 is continuous, and any
choice of x that maximizes g4(x,W), maximizes g3(x,W). We apply the the
T h e o r e mo ft h eM a x i m u mt og3(x,W).F o re a c hW ∈ [0,∞),l e tV A
T (W)=
maxx∈[0,1] g4(x,W) and G2(W)={x ∈ [0,1] : g4(x,W)=V A
T (W)}.T h e n
V A
T (W) is a continuous real-valued function, and G2(W) is a non-empty,
compact valued and upper hemi-continuous correspondence.
Again we need to discuss the limiting behavior of V A
T (W).T h eﬁrst order











0((c − W)/w)cdc (2)
It follows immediately that as W approaches inﬁnity, ϕ(x∗) approaches zero.





W e−ϕ(x∗)cv0((c − W)/w)dc,
which diﬀers from the right-hand side of (2) by the presence of the extra c





W e−ϕ(x∗)cv0((c − W)/w)cdc,










e−ϕ(x∗)cu0(c)cdc approaches zero. It follows that
limW→∞ V A0
T (W)=0 .




T (W) and V A
T (W) are continuous and real valued, VT(W) is con-
tinuous and real valued. Since V M0
T (W) and V A0
T (W) approach zero as W
approaches inﬁnity, VT(W) is dominated by a real-valued and diﬀerentiable
function whose derivative approaches zero as W approaches inﬁnity. This
completes our analysis of period T.
We now turn to the induction step. Suppose that Vt+1(W) is contin-
uous and real valued and there exists a real-valued, diﬀerentiable function
Ft+1(W) >V t+1(W) such that limW→∞ F0
t+1(W)=0 .
We ﬁrst consider the optimal period t policy in the case of attention. We
ﬁrst consider the optimal consumption choice given labor input and then the
optimal labor input. Let I = W + wtl be the resources available given the
period t labor decision. Let g5(c)=u(c)+βVt+1((1+rt+1)(I−c)).T ob o u n d
g5 below, we deﬁne g6(c)=m a x {g5(c),g 5(I/2) − 1}.F o r e a c h I ∈ [0,∞),
let h1(I)=m a x c∈[0,I] g6(c) and G3(I)={c ∈ [0,I]:g6(c)=h1(I)}.S i n c e
g6 is a continuous, real-valued function and the constraint correspondence is
continuous in I, we can use the Theorem of the Maximum to conclude that
h1(I) is continuous and G3(W) is a non-empty, compact valued and upper
hemi-continuous correspondence.
Let ˆ h(I)=m a x c u(c)+βF((1 + rt+1)(I − c)). ˆ h(I) >h 1(I).M o r e -
over, ˆ h(I) is diﬀerentiable and ˆ h0(I)=u0(ˆ c) where ˆ c ∈ argmaxˆ h(I).S i n c e
limW→∞ F0(W)=0 , c must approach inﬁnity as I approaches inﬁnity. Hence
limI→∞ ˆ h0(I)=0 .
We turn to the labor choice. Let g7(x,W)=h1(W + wϕ(x)) − v(ϕ(x)),
and let g8(x,W)=m a x {g7(x,W),g 7(.5,W) − 1}.S i n c e h1(I) < ˆ h(I), and
limI→∞ ˆ h0(I)=0 , and v0(l) > 0,w ek n o wt h a tf o re a c hW, g7 is bounded
above. Hence g8 is a real valued function. It maps [0,1]×[0,∞) into R.S i m -
ilar arguments to those above establish that V M
t (W)=m a x x∈[0,1] g8(x,W)
is continuous and that and G4(W)={x ∈ [0,1] : g8(x,W)=V M
t (W)} is a
non-empty, compact valued and upper hemi-continuous correspondence.
Note that V M
t (W) <F M(W) ≡ maxx ˆ h1(W + wϕ(x)) − v(ϕ(x)).M o r e -
over, limW→∞ FM0(W)=0 .
Now suppose that the agent is absent-minded in period t.A g a i n w e
break down the period. We ﬁrst consider the optimal labor choice given
the realization of consumption and then the optimal stopping strategy. Let
g9(x;c,W)=βVt+1((1 + rt+1)(max{0,W − c + wϕ(x)}) − v(ϕ(x)) and let
g10(x;c,W)=m a x {g9(x;c,W),βV t+1(0)−1}. The labor choice must pay for
consumption. This implies that ϕ(x) > min{0,(c − W)/(c − W + w)} ≡ ˆ ϕ.
26Note also that g9(x;c,W) <g 10(x;c,W) ≡ βF((1+rt+1)(max{0,W−c+
wϕ(x)})−v(ϕ(x)).S i n c eF and v are real valued functions with limW→∞ F0(W)=
0 and v0(ϕ(x)) > 0, we know that given c and W, g10(x;c,W) < ∞ for all
x ∈ [0,1]. g9(x;c,W) is therefore a real valued function mapping [0,1]×[0,∞)
into R.
Similar arguments to those above establish that h2(c,W)=m a x x∈[ˆ ϕ,1] g9(x;c,W)
is continuous and that and G5(W)={x ∈ [ˆ ϕ,1] : g10(x;c,W)=h2(c,W)}
is a non-empty, compact valued and upper hemi-continuous correspondence.
Moreover we can deﬁne ˆ h2(c,W)=m a x x∈[ˆ ϕ,1] g10(x;c,W). ˆ h2(c,W) >h 2(c,W)
and limW→∞ ˆ h0
2(c,W)=0 .
We turn to the choice of stopping strategy. Let g11(x,W)=ϕ(x)
R
e−ϕ(x)c[h2(c,W)]dc,
and let g12(x,W)=m a x {g11(x),g 11(.5) − 1}. Similar arguments to those
above establish that V A
t (W)=m a x x∈[0,1] g12(x,W) − m is continuous and
that and G6(W)={x ∈ [0,1] : g12(x,W)=V A
t (W)} is a non-empty, com-
pact valued and upper hemi-continuous correspondence.
Now V A
t (W) < ˆ V A
t (W)=m a x x∈[0,1] ϕ(x)
R
e−ϕ(x)c[ˆ h2(c,W)]dc. Similar
arguments as above show limW→∞ ˆ V A0
t (W)=0 .
Vt(W)=m a x {V A
t (W),VM
t (W)} i st h e r e f o r ec o n t i n u o u sa n dt h e r ee x i s t sa
diﬀerentiable function Ft(W) such that Ft(W) >V t(W) and limW→∞F0
t(W)=
0. This completes the induction step and the proof of the proposition.¤
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30Table 1




uncertainty share of income
food and drink at home .449 .287 .11
clothing .745 .502 .03
telephone .425 .308 .02
credit card spending .520 .414 .29
943 households. Uncertainty is the 90-10 conﬁdence interval divided by the mean.
The share of income is calculated from the subset of fully employed households.
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Standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates 5% level of signiﬁcance.
** indicates 1% level of signiﬁcance.
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Standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates 5% level of signiﬁcance.
** indicates 1% level of signiﬁcance.
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